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Introduction
The 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Doha, Qatar, ended with the agreement that the Kyoto-Protocol is extended until a new international agreement will become effective in 2020. This once again directed attention to the role, which technology development and technology transfer can play in combating climate change. One reason is that technology transfer can be achieved through bilateral arrangements without the need of a framework convention. This is of particular importance as long as the fastest-growing economies of Asia and Latin America are free of obligations to curb greenhouse gas emissions. A second reason is that technological change is at core in fighting climate change. Any stabilization of the atmospheric carbon concentration below catastrophic levels requires to eliminate carbon emissions almost completely within the next century (see McCarthy et al., 2001 ). The most effective way to do this is to develop and to use climate-friendly technologies. These could include improvements in energy efficiency, advanced technologies for generating electricity or carbon capturing and sequestration (CCS).
Today, the potential for inventing more energy-efficient and climate-related technologies is primarily concentrated in the industrialized countries. However, the need for such technologies is most urgent in the developing world. According to World Bank statistics (see World Bank, 2013) , the carbon intensity (measured in kg of CO2 per 2005 PPP$ of GDP) is significantly lower in high income countries than in low to middle income countries. Furthermore, the Energy Information Administration (2011) projects that by 2035 carbon emissions of non-OECD countries will exceed those of the OECD members by more than 100%, while technological innovations will still occur in only a few, highly industrialized countries. Not surprisingly, a large number of both scientific and political commentaries advocate the development of new technologies and argue that the transfer of such technologies to developing countries must be a central element of any climate protection policy.
In a study, which covers the period from 1998 to 2003 and uses patent counts to measure both the output and the international transfer of technologies, Dechezlepretre et al. (2011) found that the majority of technology transfers is between the developed countries. Northto-South transfers account for less than 25%, while South-to-South transfers are almost nonexistent. This suggests a huge potential for extending North-to-South transfers further.
But what are the effects of transferring technologies from the industrialized countries to the developing ones on global emissions and regional welfare? How do the implementation and the transfer of more energy efficient technologies affect the global market for carbon energy and vice versa? And, under which circumstances does the North have an incentive at all for transferring advanced technologies? Answering these questions for a world, where technology transfer from North to the South is combined either with unilateral climate policies or full cooperation in the solution of the global climate problem, is at the center of this analysis.
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For more than twenty years, the economic literature discusses how technology transfer can be helpful in avoiding the adverse effects of global climate change (for an overview see Popp, 2011) . Some papers take trade aspects into account (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004) . This is of particular importance, since international transfers such as providing technical assistance for coping with climate change, can lead to what is called a transfer paradox (see Takarada, 2005, Otha and Nakagawa, 2008) . Lee (2001) for example discloses such a paradox in the sense that, despite of the transfer, the industrialized donor gains economic welfare while the recipient developing country loses welfare. Terms-of-trade deterioration is the principal reason for such a result as is recognized since the pioneering work of Bhagwati et al. (1983) . To explain this with an example suppose for a moment that the developing countries were net exporters of carbon energy and that transferring more efficient technologies would lead to a reduction of global demand for carbon energy (which it must not, as we will see below). Then world market prices of carbon energy would fall, from which welfare losses in the recipients' world and welfare gains in the donors' countries could result.
A part of the rich literature on the provision of public goods also discusses the issue of technology transfer and typically employs a game-theory setting where trade issues are neglected. For example Buchholz and Konrad (1994) show that if countries with an inferior technology adopt a more advanced one, the quality of the environment nonetheless might deteriorate. Stranlund (1996) demonstrates that both the environmental quality and the welfare of 2 We are not discussing the aspect of incentive compatibility of technology transfers for participation and compliance in climate change mitigation. For a discussion, see Barrett (2006) , Buob and Stephan (2013) . the donors will rise if the level of technology transfers was fixed, before countries noncooperatively determine their optimal abatement activities. Golombek and Hoel (2011) discuss international cooperation on technology development as an alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions. They argue that because of technology spillovers each country should invest into new technologies beyond levels, which are optimal in the noncooperative case. Finally, Helm and Pichler (2011) present evidence that in case of international permit trading subsidizing technology transfers will lead to a reduction of international permit prices, from which the industrialized countries can profit if they are permit buyers.
A third strand of literature uses numerical simulation models for analyzing qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of technology transfers. Much of this literature is based on the work of Yang (1999) , Popp (2004) or Nordhaus and Yang (2006) and applies some variant of the RICE model of integrated assessment of global climate change. 3 Mostly the results sound encouraging. Recently, Aronsson et al. (2010) showed that if the countries of the South are free from obligations to curb greenhouse gas emissions, then both the North and the South will profit from technology transfers through a better environment and higher welfare. A closer look on these studies reveals that carbon energy is not an input into production and that technological change has no effect other than reducing costs of greenhouse gas abatement. As such transferring technology diminishes the cost-of-abatement differential across regions and allows for abating greenhouse gases more efficiently. This explains why from the perspective of the North technology transfer is motivated even if transfer costs are nonnegligible.
Technology transfer, however, is not only a mean for lowering abatement costs. Technology transfer and innovation can also contribute to economic growth, for example through increasing the energy-efficiency of technologies and production. Data on the transfer of patents show that between 1978 and 2003 the share of climate-related patents always stood below 2% (see Dechezlepretre et al., 2011) . Moreover, the majority of transfers relate to patents on more energy efficient technologies. This motivates a first point of departure from the existing literature on technology transfer and greenhouse gas mitigation. We explicitly include carbon energy into our framework and consider the North-to-South transfer of more energy-efficient technologies. However, increasing the energy efficiency through using more efficient technologies can raise greenhouse gas emissions (see Brännlund et al., 2007) . The intuition is that improvements in energy efficiency create an income effect through which demand for energy is stimulated. Or to phrase it differently, efficiency gains wipe out the emission reductions, and hence, a "rebound effect" occurs.
Most of the literature on technological change and the provision of public goods, which is relevant in our context, do not consider international trade. However, since technological change affects the demand for carbon energy and hence the terms-of-trade, which in turn has an impact on welfare, trade in carbon energy should be explicitly taken into account.
This motivates the second point of departure from the existing literature. We assume that carbon energy, which includes oil, gas and coal mainly, is traded on a single integrated world market. 4 However, if there is international trade in carbon energy and other energyintensive basic materials, carbon leakage can occur. For example, unilateral greenhouse gas abatement in one region could generate terms-of-trade effects, which let the unconstraint region import more carbon energy and hence emit more than it would do otherwise (for a discussion, see Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins, 2000) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
It is kept deliberately simple, but covers international trade in carbon energy as well as North-to South transfer of more energy-efficient technologies. Section 3 discusses two pos- 
A simple model
To fix ideas, let the world be divided into two regions. For vividness they are called North and South. North (N) consists of the OECD countries plus the former Soviet Union. Roughly, this corresponds to the ANNEX I parties. South (S) covers the rest of the world, hence includes those countries, which the Kyoto Protocol exempts from the duty of greenhouse gas abatement.
For each region outputs are aggregated into a single numeraire good, which can be consumed domestically and can be used to cover costs of energy supply. To keep considerations as simple as possible, technological knowledge and carbon energy are the only inputs into regional production. Formally this implies that for each region n = N,S gross domestic production is characterized by the function , where the region's energy input is measured in carbon equivalents to energy consumption. This directly governs the emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. denotes the region's stock of technological knowledge and rules the energy efficiency of regional production. This means in particular that new technologies can increase the energy efficiency and/or might reduce the carbon intensity of domestic production. Note that increased energy efficiency here is understood as the possibility to produce the same output with lower energy inputs but without increasing the inputs of other factors of production (see Golombek and Hoel, 2011) : For, if increased energy efficiency could be achieved through using more of other inputs, this would be a substitution effect only. This, by the way, is a justification why we keep our modeling framework deliberately simple.
Technological knowledge is different from other inputs into production such as raw materials, energy, labor or physical capital. To capture some of its essential features let us assume (see Gillingham et al., 2007) :
(1) Once installed in a region, technological knowledge is a non-rival input into regional production and can be applied as often as desired.
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Given that regional production is linear homogenous in energy this implies (2.1) .
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(2) Technological knowledge is appropriable to the single region.
That means, each region has the ability to capture all benefits derived from more efficient technologies and can exclude other regions from using that technology. This in turn implies that sharing technological knowledge entails the policy decision to transfer technologies.
Note here that the state of technology Z N is given and not subject to endogenous change.
Transferring technology simply means that Z S gets closer to Z N .
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) technology transfers include the diffusion of technological knowledge as well as technology cooperation across and within countries (see Peterson, 2008) . On one hand this requires learning to understand, to utilize and to replicate the new technologies. On the other hand it requires the ability to choose and to adapt technologies to the local conditions (see Metz, 2007) . As such technology transfer occurs neither automatically nor costless. However, since we are interested in the strategic interaction between mitigation and the transfer of more energy efficient technologies, for the sake of simplicity let us neglect the issue of costs of technology transfers.
Furthermore let us neglect the issue of developing new technologies. Instead, assume throughout this paper that the North always owns a stock of more energy efficient technologies, i.e. , which can be transferred free of costs to the South.
Carbon energy is produced in both regions and is traded on an open international market.
Therefore, if denotes the energy supply of region n, the world energy market is in equilibrium, if (2.2) .
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For example, once the laws of thermodynamics have been discovered, they could be applied as often as desired. This discriminates technological knowledge from human capital, where knowledge is inherently tied to a person, hence can be used only if that person is present.
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As indicated by one of the referees, notation could be simplified by using .
Carbon energy is Janus-faced. The more energy is put into production, the higher is the domestic output, but simultaneously, the higher are greenhouse gas emissions. This drives global climate change, which is a public bad and negatively affects regional welfare.
In principle there are two categories of climate change impacts. On one hand there are impacts, which can be directly measured in terms of output losses (for example, in case of agriculture prices exist, which allow assigning market values to these output losses). Consequently these impacts are termed market damages. On the other hand there are so-called non-market damages, such as species losses or catastrophic changes in the ocean currents,
which cannot be directly expressed in terms of a national accounting system (see Manne and Stephan, 2005) .
This paper concentrates on market damages of climate change, or to phrase it differently, the impacts of climate change materialize in losses of regional gross production of the composite good. 7 Therefore, let , with and , denote the regional climate damage factor, which is a function of global emissions and measures the fraction of conventional output that is at disposal in region n. That means, the more carbon energy is consumed world-wide, the higher is the stock of globally accumulated greenhouse gas emissions and hence the lower will be the fraction of conventional wealth that is available to region n. The remaining fraction is called green GDP.
In each region n green GDP has to cover: (1) regional consumption , (2) costs of energy supply, which are a strictly increasing function of regional energy output and which are measured in units of domestic GDP, and (3) potential deficits from trading carbon energy. That means
Sectors differ with respect to their vulnerability to climate change. Some sectors are highly sensitive. Typical examples are agriculture, fishery and forestry. Other sectors such as telecommunication or industrial manufacturing remain almost unaffected by climate change. As common in the integrated assessment literature (see Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) , we aggregate sectoral outputs of a given region into a single composite good and express the effects of climate change on the production in percentage output losses.
where p denotes the world market price of carbon energy.
Analysis
In the following, let us consider two possible states of the world: one, where more energy efficient technologies are transferred unconditionally from the North to the South, and one, where the North-to-South technology transfer is tied to the requirement that the South in some way contributes to the solution of the global climate problem.
In case of unconditional transfers we discuss two different scenarios. The first one is based upon the assumption that the North unconditionally transfers more energy efficient technologies to South and that both regions then independently determinate their abatement levels. This very much reminds of a fallback into a pre-Kyoto world. The second scenario, which is called Kyoto-forever, reflects the situation that the Kyoto protocol is extended and that the North combines tightening its own emission targets, as proposed by the European The left side implies that in optimum the marginal green productivity of carbon energy has to be bigger than marginal damage . The right side implies , which means that in equilibrium the elasticity of regional climate damages has to be bigger than -1. Or to phrase it differently, the percentage change in climate damages has to be smaller than the percentage change in energy consumption.
Condition (3.1) implicitly defines the regional demand for carbon energy as function of the world market price p, demand of the other region and the regional technology stock , i.e., . Taking the total differential gives .
The first term represents the price effect, the second is the leakage effect and the last indicates that there might be a rebound effect.
Because of the assumptions imposed on the damage function the price effect is negative, (3.4) .
Hence the demand for carbon energy will decrease if world markets prices rise ceteris paribus. The second term is determined by is positive as follows from condition (3.3). Hence, although the energy efficiency 8 increases, more energy will be used as input into production and a rebound effect is observed.
Unconditional North-to-South technology transfers

Transfers in a pre-Kyoto world
As mentioned above the first scenario is based on the assumption that in stage 1 the North decides to transfer unconditionally technologies to the South, while in stage 2 both regions independently determine their optimal levels of greenhouse gas emissions. For analyzing the effects of an unconditional technology transfer through which the technology stock of the South will rise, i.e., , let us take the total differential of condition (3.1) as well as of the market condition (2.2). After some manipulations this leads to the following system of linear equations (see Appendix) (3.7)
. Let denote the determinate of the above matrix, which is positive as is shown in the Appendix. By applying Cramer's rule we get from (3.7) as well as conditions (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) (3.8) .
Obviously, the world market price of carbon energy is driven by a raising demand for energy in the South caused by a rebound effect (see condition (3.6)). This price increase, however, is slightly dampened, since the North counteracts by reducing its own inputs of carbon energy (see condition (3.5)). In other words, there is what might be called a combination of rebound effects and an "inverse" leakage effect where the rebound effect, however, dominates.
That the South indeed extends its consumption of carbon energy and hence its greenhouse gas emission, whereas the North reduces its own carbon emissions in response to the re-
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Note that bound effect caused by transferring more energy efficient technologies to the South, becomes obvious if we consider (3.9) (3.10)
The positive sign in (3.9) and the negative sign in (3.10) immediately follow from conditions Obviously, the North could profit from such a policy only if it is a net-exporter of carbon energy and if the increase in profits from net exports due to raising world market prices of carbon energy would overcompensate the welfare losses caused by raising market damages of global climate change. In any other case the North has no economic incentive to transfer technologies unconditionally to the South as condition (3.11) indicates. The South, however, can profit; in particular in case if the South is a net-exporter of carbon energy (see condition (3.12)). As such the overall message is clear. From an unconditional transfer of more energy efficient technologies neither the climate nor the donator will profit. Transferring more energy efficient technologies creates a rebound effect in the South, which is high enough to let the world-wide consumption of carbon energy grow. This happens despite of the fact that due to rising energy prices the North reduces its own consumption. Or to phrase it more provocatively, unconditional technology transfers are more or less nothing else than wealth transfers from the North to the South.
Kyoto-forever
The next scenario, which is called Kyoto-forever, combines two elements of international climate policies: (1) a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in Annex I countries as already announced by the European Union, and (2), transfers of advanced technologies from the developed to the developing world as originally foreseen in the Kyoto-Protocol and reinforced by the Bali Action Plan (see Marcellino and Gerstetter, 2010) . 9 In other words, the Kyoto-forever scenario assumes that in stage 1 the North simultaneously decides on own mitigation and technology transfers. Therefore, at the beginning of stage 2 both technology transfers , which are measured as changes of the South's technology stock, and changes in the North's input of carbon energy are given. Then condition (3.1) together with the market clearance condition (2.2) determine the following system of linear equations, which characterizes the South´s decision problem in stage 2 (see Appendix) (3.13) .
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Under the Convention, the developed country parties and other developed parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly to developing countries to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention (Article 4.5 UNFCCC).
By using Cramer's rule we get (3.14) , (3.15)
As condition (3.14) demonstrates, both North-to-South technology transfer and unilateral climate policy affect the world market price of carbon energy, but overall effects are not clear. (1) The numerator of the first term on the right side corresponds to the net impact, which the changing energy consumption in the North has on prices. Since , net impacts are positive and world market prices ceteris paribus will fall, if the North decides to reduce its inputs of carbon energy. (2) The numerator of the second term on the right side reflects that transferring technologies to the South will stimulate the South's demand of carbon energy. Thus the world market price of carbon energy ceteris paribus will rise.
This indicates that we will observe both a leakage and a rebound effect. This becomes more obvious if we consider condition (3.15). As the second term on the right hand side shows, increasing the energy efficiency in the South through technology transfer will stimulate the demand for carbon energy, hence this will lead to higher carbon emissions in the South. This is what the literature calls a rebound effect.
Recalculation of the first term of equation (3.15) gives , which implies leakage. However, the leakage effect does not fully compensate the reduction of emissions, which the North has decided on in stage 1. Consequently, without technology transfer to the South, global emissions would be reduced. In other words, the terms-of-trade effect solely would not imply that globally accumulated emissions will rise.
Nonetheless, Kyoto-forever could turn out to be a bad policy, both for the global climate as well as for the North. First, the leakage and the rebound effect together may wipe out the mitigation efforts of the North. This might result in higher global greenhouse gas emissions than without the policy intervention of the North (see condition (3.15)). Second, while the North has to bear the costs of greenhouse gas abatement eventually without gaining benefit from a reduction of climate damages, this could negatively affect the North's welfare. Therefore let us consider stage 1 and discuss: (1) Which conditions grant that global emissions will fall despite of technology transfers to the South? (2) Under which conditions is Kyoto-forever Pareto improving?
First, suppose that . This requires (see (3.15)) , hence (3.16) .
Accordingly, there is an upper limit on North-to-South technology transfer, which depends on the net-effect of the emission reduction policy of the North as well as the impact of technology transfers on carbon inputs in the South. Or to phrase it differently, the smaller the leakage effect and the smaller the rebound effect, the more technology can be transferred to the South without increasing global greenhouse gas emissions.
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Note further, if , conditions (3.8) and (3.10) imply . Or to put it differently, leakage and rebound effects are not strong enough such that there will be no impact on world market prices of carbon energy.
10 Using conditions (3.5) and (3.6) this gives . I.e., the upper limit on technology transfer depends on the marginal rate of substitution between technology and energy on one hand and energy consumption as well as marginal damages on the other.
Next, let us discuss the second question from above. As in Section 3. 
Conditional North-to-South Transfers
Kyoto-reversed
Under Kyoto-reversed assumptions not only more energy efficient technologies but also part of the duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is shifted from Annex I to non-Annex I countries. This means that in the first stage the North decides to transfer technologies, while the South commits itself on climate mitigation. Hence, at the beginning of stage 2 technology transfers as well as changes in the South's input of carbon energy are given.
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Therefore condition (3.1) together with the market clearance condition (2.2) after some manipulations now gives 11 Obviously, this creates a participation problem. We will return to this issue in the conclusions.
(3.17) .
By using Cramer's rule we get (3.18) .
which, because of , implies falling prices, if the South reduces emissions.
Falling prices ceteris paribus stimulate rising demand for carbon energy in the North. Indeed, from (3.17) by applying Cramer's rule again we obtain (3.19) .
This means that now emissions in the North will rise if emissions in the South are reduced.
However, the increase will be less than unity such that accumulated emissions nonetheless will fall.
Finally, let us discuss how regional consumption changes under Kyoto-reversed assumptions. 
Conclusions
Can technology transfer be a complement or a substitute for an internationally coordinated climate policy? As our analysis reveals, even under optimistic assumptions rebound and leakage effects hinder a welfare improving solution of the climate problem. Under the pres-ently prevailing climate policy regime, which corresponds to a Kyoto-forever scenario, the North has for economic reasons almost no incentive to voluntarily transfer technologies to the South even at costs zero. Furthermore, global emissions will only go down if an upper limit on North-to-South technology transfer is obeyed. Such limit depends on the net-effect of the emission reduction policy of the North as well as the impact of technology transfers on carbon inputs in the South. What turns out to be a suitable option both in terms of regional welfare and climate change mitigation is to impose binding emission targets in the South and transferring, as a kind of compensation, energy-efficient technologies from the industrialized to the developing countries. However, this is not really a novelty and it is not good news either. It immediately raises a compliance and commitment problem. Why should the South contribute to greenhouse gas abatement once the technologies are transferred? One idea could be that technologies are transferred only once the South established a reliable climate change policy, for example through implementing a carbon tax. This implies that the chronological ordering of policy steps is reversed compared to the scenarios discussed today, for it requires that there will be some reliable commitment for greenhouse gas abatement before technologies are transferred. Taking the total differential of condition (3.1) as well as of the market condition (2.2) leads to the system of linear equations .
Multiplying the second row with gives (3.7).
Section 3.2.1
Taking the total differential of condition (3.1) gives .
Assume that and that is given For applying Cramer's rule, let us calculate the determinant of the above matrix, which is . Then .
